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Agony, Exclusion and Colonial Reproduction: A Critical Examination of the Doctrine of 
Difference in Aotearoa New Zealand 
George Fitzgerald and Stephen Young*
 
This article examines how contemporary legal discourse perpetuates and reproduces colonial structures 
and some less risky alternatives. It does so through an inquiry into how First Peoples enter into legal 
relationships with the Crown. In this inquiry, we combine the doctrine of discovery, a well-known concept 
in the literature of Indigenous peoples and law, with the “dynamic of difference”, a concept stemming 
from ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’, to generate what we call the “doctrine of 
difference”. The doctrine of difference aids in orienting legal discourse within broader conceptualisations 
of power to better understand the risks that arise when First Peoples enter into legal relationships with 
the Crown. One way of entering into legal relationships is to use rights-based legal discourse. Through 
the doctrine of difference, we argue that this requires rights claimants to construct themselves as subjects 
of a pre-existing legal discourse, which reproduces the universalising and naturalising dynamics 
associated with colonialism. In contrast, First Peoples may enter into a legal relationship through an 
agonistic deliberative process that re-centres and invests in place-based legalities, languages and forms 
of life. Such agonistic deliberative alternatives may partially avoid some of the universalising and 
naturalising effects (re)produced by rights-based legal discourse. 
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I. Introduction 
From October to December 2019, a “journey of national significance” took place.1 In a voyage 
traversing the northern coastline of Aotearoa New Zealand, a six-vessel flotilla commemorated 
Tuia 250, the 250th anniversary of the first encounters between Māori and Pākehā following the 
arrival of Captain James Cook.2 These “commemorations” are contentious. A protest organiser 
Marise Lant said:3  
The reality of it is that when James Cook arrived in Tūranganui-a-Kiwa, he came under the banner 
of the British Government. With that came a set of rules, regulations and other organisation’s 
systems that we are not, and were not accustomed to. 
As such, Tuia 250 strikes at the heart of New Zealand identity, exposing the wounds of 
colonisation and its legal structures, which continue to fester beneath the powerful mythmaking 
of bicultural harmony. In the 250 years since the violent collision of Māori and Pākehā legalities, 
the rules, regulations and legal discourse that James Cook brought with him have changed and 
transformed. However, as we argue here, contemporary legal discourse about rules and 
regulations reproduces universalising and naturalising dynamics that continue to legitimise the 
imposition of a foreign legal structure on Māori. 
Building on the notion that settler colonialism is a “structure, not an event”,4 this article 
examines how contemporary legal discourse perpetuates and reproduces structures that we call 
“colonial”.5 Whilst our scope is limited to examining Aotearoa New Zealand’s contemporary 
legal institutions for Māori-Crown relations, our approach has significance for First Nations-
Crown relations elsewhere, particularly in Australia and Canada, because we query how First 
Peoples enter into legal relationships with the Crown. How First Nations enter into legal relations 
with the Crown (or anyone else) matters because some methods of entering into legal relations 
are more or less flexible, amenable, co-optable and exclusionary than others. That is to say, some 
methods may facilitate or enable Māori and First Peoples legality better than others.  
In particular, we argue that one way of entering into legal relationships is to use rights-
based legal discourse, which involves constructing oneself as a subject of a pre-existing legal 
                                                     
1 Ministry for Culture and Heritage “Tuia 250”(26 June 2019) <mch.govt.nz>. 
2 Ministry for Culture and Heritage “Tuia – Encounters 250 in the Classroom” (3 September 2019) New Zealand 
History <nzhistory.govt.nz>. 
3 Editorial “‘I don’t see James Cook as relevant to me’ – Tuia 250 protest organiser” (8 October 2019) 1 News 
<www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news>. 
4 Patrick Wolfe “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native” (2006) 8(4) Journal of Genocide Research 
387 at 388; but see J Kēhaulani Kauanui “‘A Structure, Not an Event’: Settler Colonialism and Enduring 
Indigeneity” (2016) 5(1) Lateral; Chris Youé “Settler colonialism or colonies with settlers?” (2018) 52(1) Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 69.  
5 The type of effects arising from the discourses we discuss pre-dates formalised colonialism. We call it “colonial” 
because we see it as similar to the “multigenerational and multifaceted process of forced dispossession and 
attempted acculturation” that Taiaiake Alfred calls “colonial”: Taiaiake Alfred “Colonialism and State Dependence” 
(2009) 5 Journal of Aboriginal Health 42 at 52.   
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discourse.6 Constructing oneself as a subject of a pre-existing rights-based legal discourse is 
problematic because it reproduces the universalising and naturalising dynamics contained in the 
doctrine of discovery that legitimised imperial expansion and the imposition of a colonial legal 
structure on native peoples.7 To make this argument, we combine the doctrine of discovery – a 
well-known concept in the scholarship on Indigenous peoples and law – with the “dynamic of 
difference” – a concept stemming from ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’.8 Though 
we acknowledge differences and tensions between First Peoples and proponents of the Third 
World,9 combining the “doctrine of discovery” and the “dynamic of difference” into what we call 
the “doctrine of difference” enables us to evaluate how rights-based discourses reproduce 
universalising and naturalising powers. This approach also orients legal discourse within broader 
conceptualisations of power to argue that those who employ rights-based legal discourse generate 
partial pictures of power that elide underlying subject-forming powers, affiliated colonial 
structures and violence. Accordingly, the erasure of these powers explains why it does not 
intuitively appear as though rights-based discourses reproduce colonial structures. In contrast to 
entering into legal relationships through rights-based discourse, First Peoples may enter into a 
legal relationship through an agonistic deliberative process that re-centres and invests in place-
based legalities and languages (or first laws). We argue that this agonistic deliberative alternative 
may partially avoid some of the universalising and naturalising effects (re)produced by rights-
based legal discourse.   
Part II of this article further describes our methodological and theoretical framework. 
There, we establish these different ways of entering into legal relationships. The remainder of the 
article then considers how Māori-Crown legal relations demonstrate the doctrine of difference 
and an agonistic deliberative approach. Part III provides a historiography of Māori-Crown legal 
relations to show that courts continue to deploy the doctrine of difference. We chart the colonial 
legal structure in Treaty of Waitangi jurisprudence, highlighting the constitutive moments where 
a rights-discourse is employed, and finish that part with an evaluation of Proprietors of Wakatū 
                                                     
6 See Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New 
York, 2020) at 9.  
7 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). 
8 Antony Anghie Imperialism: Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005) at 4; Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja “Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality 
of International Law” 3(1) (2011) Trade, Law and Development 1 at 104. “TWAIL” scholarship aims to critically 
historicise and rethink the Eurocentric and imperialist logics of international law that operate to legitimate the 
subordination of peoples in the ‘Global South’: see for example B S Chimni International Law and World Order: A 
Critique of Contemporary Approaches (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2017); Balakrishnan 
Rajagopol International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2003). 
9 See for example B S Chimni “Anti-Imperialism: Then and Now” in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki 
Nesiah (eds) Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2017) at 46. 
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v Attorney-General.10 After tracing the doctrine of difference through the courts, Part IV 
examines an alternative method for entering into a legal relationship. It re-reads the legal 
enactment of legal personhood for Te Urewera as an agonistic deliberative process.11 Though we 
note that legal personhood for Te Urewera is not a perfect solution, we examine how it might 
tactically operate to exclude certain dimensions of colonial legal discourse.12 
II. The Doctrine of Difference and Alternative Agonists  
This part begins by explaining the formation of the doctrine of difference. It then provides 
an example of how it operates by entering individuals and communities into legal relationships 
as “Indigenous peoples” – this demonstrates the universalising and naturalising effects of 
international legal discourse. After examining the doctrine of difference and the features of a 
rights-based legal discourse, we then examine how agonistic deliberative processes are an 
alternative way of entering into a legal relationship. 
A. Formation of the Doctrine of difference 
The establishment of a colonial structure of legality via discovery has its origins in the 
Roman Catholic Church’s assumption of a “worldwide papal jurisdiction”.13 The Pope assumed a 
“divine mandate to care for the entire world”, which obligated the Church to amass a “universal 
Christian commonwealth”.14 This universal mandate overrode non-Christians’ ability to self-
govern, often requiring their subjection to the Church and defined any violations of this natural 
law by “infidels” as justifying their invasion and dispossession.15 Although papal bulls legitimated 
voyages of discovery and conquest in “the New World”, Spanish scholars began to question papal 
authority, which transformed the theological grounding of the doctrine into a quasi-legalistic 
discourse. Francisco de Vitoria accepted that “Indians” in the Americas possessed natural rights 
as land-owners and “free and rational people” so that European discovery alone could not transfer 
title.16 By imposing a putatively universal but Eurocentric discourse of “natural rights” and 
                                                     
10 Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General [2017] NZSC 17, [2017] 1 NZLR 423. 
11 Te Urewera Act 2014. 
12 In focusing on attempts to tactically deploy legal exclusionary functions, we take up the suggestion that 
“international lawyers need to reflect less on salvation, and more on what to abandon, or set aside” put forward in 
Fleur Johns “On Dead Circuits and Non-Events” in Kevin Jon Heller and Ingo Venzke (eds) Contingency and the 
Course of International Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming) (UNSW Law Research Paper No 19-80, 2019). 
13 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010)7 at 9, citing Anthony Pagden Lords of all the World: Ideologies of 
Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500–c.1800 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995) at 8, 24 and 126. 
14 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 9. 
15 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 9–10. 
16 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 14.  
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rationality on the natives, Vitoria ensured that the Spaniards could practice their natural rights 
abroad.17 Should any natives then infringe upon Spanish rights, Spain could be seen to justifiably 
enforce their rights through “just wars” against the natives.18 
From a Third World perspective, Antony Anghie argues that Vitoria instituted a “civilising 
mission”: an overarching legal project that legitimised colonialism as “a means of redeeming the 
backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-European world by 
incorporating them into the universal civilization of Europe”.19 Based on such ethnocentric notions 
of European superiority, this civilising mission is propelled by a “dynamic of difference”.20 It 
involves manufacturing “a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilised, 
and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to normalise the aberrant society”.21 
Imposing this ostensibly universal discourse about natural law on the natives enabled European 
intervention and protection for any ipso facto derogation of rights.  
Under our framework, legal discourse combines a doctrine of discovery with the dynamic 
of difference to become a “doctrine of difference”. It involves imposing on people a pre-
established and ostensibly universalised legal discourse, which subjects them to the discourse as 
either unintelligibility different and aberrant, or intelligible when translated into the discourse. 
Contemporary rights-based legal discourses within settler states reproduce a doctrine of difference. 
As one form of social power, legal discourse – the terminology, speech and ways of enacting and 
entering into legal relationships – precedes and produces its subjects.22 As a discourse that precedes 
and produces its subjects, it has a truth-producing function. When rights claimants assert rights, it 
appears to be their own “natural” powers, rather than the power of the legal discourse that pre-
exists them.23 The discourse then appears universally true by naturalising the subjects that it 
                                                     
17 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 14. 
18 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 14. For an argument that contemporary humanitarian interventionism 
remains predicated on similar universalising legal narratives, see Anne Orford “Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading 
the Narratives of the New Interventionism” (1999) 10(4) EJIL 679; and Talal Asad “Reflections on Violence, Law, 
and Humanitarianism” (2015) 41(2) Critical Inquiry 390. 
19 Antony Anghie Imperialism: Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005) 8at 3. 
20 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 7at 2; Antony Anghie Imperialism: Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005) 8at 4. 
21 Antony Anghie Imperialism: Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005) 8at 4 
22 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) 6at 9.  
23 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 56–58. 
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produces.24 Legal discourse produces that of which it speaks – its subjects – but then naturalises 
its subjects to appear universally true.25 Those who are not naturalised by that discourse and are 
not subjects are excluded and unidentifiable within the discourse. Importantly, legal subjects who 
reiterate terms of legal discourse transform it over time as words change, new subjects are 
“discovered” and terminological “slippage” occurs. This leads to slight variations, competing 
usages and intentions, and changes over time so that discourse is never fully stabilised.26 The 
doctrine of difference allows for change and transformation in legal discourse, because 
terminology can only be temporarily stabilised: as legal discourse changes, the ways in which 
subjects enter into legal relationships also change. For instance, Vitoria’s writings are 
representative of a secularisation and rationalisation of the Catholic conception of universal 
jurisdiction. Under Vitoria’s universalised and naturalised form of rationality, it was no longer 
necessary for natives to convert to Catholicism in order to be susceptible to Spanish intervention.  
Every native legal order was designated as an aberrant other unless rendered legally intelligible 
when translated into natural law.  
Armed with ‘Vitorian’ quasi-legal rules and its own common-law system, English 
imperialists used law to advance their trans-oceanic claims of discovery.27 Within the British 
Empire, the doctrine of difference was instituted into colony-building legality through its Royal 
Proclamation of 1763.28 The Proclamation sought to prevent the “great Frauds and Abuses” 
committed against tribes from unscrupulous land purchases by assuming the Crown’s monopoly 
over the ability to purchase land from tribes, which is called “pre-emption”.29 In delineating its 
jurisdiction,30 the Crown required tribal subjection to its legal discourse for inclusion within the 
law or it excluded them from its legal protections as aberrant or outside the law. Whilst the British 
Empire transformed the doctrine of difference by delineating its jurisdiction to require subjection 
or exclusion, state formation again transformed the doctrine of difference by converting it into 
                                                     
24 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 21–22. 
25 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 8, referencing Judith Butler Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (2nd ed, Routledge, 
New York and Oxford, 1999) at 5. 
26 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 36, referencing Judith Butler Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (Routledge, New York and 
Oxford, 1997) at 3. 
27 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 7at 15–17; see also Stuart Banner Possessing the Pacific: Land, 
Settlers, and Indigenous Peoples from Australia to Alaska (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 
2007). 
28 The Royal Proclamation, 1763 (UK), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II. 
29 See generally John Borrows “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-
Government” in Michael Asch (ed) Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect 
for Difference (UBC Press, Vancouver, 1997) 155–172. 
30 For an investigation into the concept of “jurisdiction”, see Shaun McVeigh and Shaunnagh Dorsett Jurisdiction 
(Routledge, Oxford and New York, 2012).  
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domestic legal discourses. 
After the American Revolution, the “Marshall Trilogy” of the United States Supreme 
Court relied on the Crown’s right of pre-emption and the doctrine of discovery as foundational 
for state–Indian relations.31 In Johnson v M’Intosh, Marshall CJ reasoned that his opinion was 
pre-regulated by the doctrine of difference, finding that a court must look to the principles of its 
government to determine the rules of property acquisition.32 Marshall CJ thus recognised 
discovery as “the original fundamental principle” governing American land titles.33 Indeed, the 
Court reasoned that the state had “absolute title” in Indian lands “subject only to Indian right of 
occupancy”,34 which, in turn, the government had “the exclusive power to extinguish”.35 On this 
basis, the Court recognised Indian rights, but not as property rights it could enforce without first 
translating Indian relations to land into a positivistic private title to property.36 The Court 
insufficiently acknowledged the violence involved in producing itself as an institution that could 
seemingly legitimise the United States’ systematic dispossession of First Peoples by constructing 
and upholding “Indian right[s] of occupancy” as the natural tools for tribal protection.37 Indeed, 
Marshall CJ stated that: “Humanity … has established … that the conquered shall not be wantonly 
oppressed” but “incorporated with the victorious nation.”38 In delineating its inherent jurisdiction 
and invoking a universalising signifier of “humanity”,39 the Court postulated a gap between its 
“civilised” legality and uncivilised tribes.40 Marshall CJ translated otherwise unrecognisable 
tribal legalities into the legal discourse of “the victorious nation” as rights of occupation.41 And, 
importantly, the opinion naturalised its positivist legal discourse as pre-existing and binding.42 
Marshall CJ infamously proclaimed: “Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror 
cannot deny”.43 In subsequent cases, the United States assumed sovereignty over tribes by 
entering them into a legal relationship that “resembles that of a ward to his guardian”.44 In doing 
                                                     
31 Matthew L M Fletcher “The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy” (2006) 82 North Dakota L Rev 628 at 629. 
32 Robert J Miller and others Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2010)7 at 54, citing Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823). 
33 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823)32 at 574. 
34 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823) at 588. 
35 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823) at 585. 
36 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823) at 588. 
37 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823) at 574, 585 and 588. 
38 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823) at 589. 
39 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823) at 589.  
40 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823) at 591.  
41 See Robert A Williams Jr The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1990). 
42 Anghie positions legal positivism, understood as “the notion of the primacy of the state” in international law, as 
central to “manag[ing] the colonial confrontation”, so that non-European states were seen as “lack[ing] the legal 
personality to assert any legal opposition”: Antony Anghie Imperialism: Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005)8 at 33–34. 
43 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US 543 (1823)32 at 588. 
44 Cherokee Nation v Georgia 20 US 1 (1831) at 11; Worcester v Georgia, 31 US 515 (1832). 
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so, the Court reproduced the doctrine of difference by entering tribes into a legal relationship with 
the United States. It operated by recognising tribes’ rights in a particularly Eurocentric manner 
that subjected them to United States legal protections and regulations or excluded them from legal 
protection as unrecognisable others.45  
However, attempting to consign these effects to the boundaries of United States Federal 
Indian Law ignores that the British Empire enacted similar cases as colonial governments 
assumed sovereignty on behalf of the Crown.46 British colonists imposed a universalising and 
naturalising legal discourse, as previously established by the Pope, transformed by Vitoria and 
incorporated into the state by Marshall CJ, over the respective colonies. British colonial courts 
imposed the doctrine of difference over First Nations in Canada,47 Aboriginal peoples in 
Australia48  and Māori in New Zealand.49 Afterwards, as each colony developed into a state with 
its own jurisdiction and jurisprudence, international law also embraced the doctrine of difference. 
To demonstrate the universalising and naturalising effects that arise from entering into legal 
relationships, the next section examines how Indigenous peoples claim international human rights 
law.  
B. The Doctrine of Difference within International Human Rights Law 
Stephen Young theorises how those who claim international human rights as Indigenous 
peoples invoke international legal discourse to enter into legal relationships by producing 
themselves as “Indigenous peoples”.50 The signifier “Indigenous peoples” first materialised in 
the 1980s when tribal peoples from around the world organised, formed themselves into 
institutions and NGOs, and sought to uphold international legal discourse as a true discourse by 
crafting a declaration on Indigenous rights.51 Subsequently, those who claim human rights as 
Indigenous peoples produce themselves as subjects of a pre-existing international legal discourse. 
Becoming a subject for human rights purposes can be an agentic and positive development for 
many, but its universalising and naturalising features are problematic.52  
For instance, it is becoming increasingly difficult to discuss First Nations, Māori, or 
Aboriginal peoples’ aspirations without invoking international legal discourse, like “rights” and 
                                                     
45 Cherokee Nation v Georgia 20 US 1 (1831) at 11–13. 
46 See for example John Borrows “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L J 537 at 561–562. 
47 St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen [1888] UKPC 70; see Kent McNeil Flawed Precedent: 
The St. Catherine’s Case and Aboriginal Title (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2019). 
48 See Cooper v Stuart [1889] UKPC 1, (1889) L R 14 App Cas 286.  
49 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 NZ Jur (NS) 72. 
50 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020)6. 
51 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at ch 2.  
52 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 41. 
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“Indigenous peoples”.53 That is otherwise unproblematic but for the fact that one must speak 
international legal discourse as a subject of that discourse to become an identifiable Indigenous 
person who can claim human rights. International legal discourse is self-sustaining in that every 
enactment of subject-status exposes new differences that the universalising and naturalising 
features of the doctrine of difference work to overcome.54 In short, the universalising international 
legal discourse “solves the problem of difference by preceding it”.55 To be recognised as a 
subject, legal discursive categories for any subject’s rights-claim must pre-exist any individual 
claimant. Legal discourse is reproduced as willing subjects then inscribe “the doctrine of 
difference” into their ways of being and make it relevant for them and their disputes.  
It is also problematic because it is an exclusionary discourse. International legal discourse 
about Indigenous peoples’ human rights is so successfully universalised that we do not have a 
word for all of those people – First Nations, Māori, Aboriginal peoples and others – except for 
the term from international legal discourse, “Indigenous peoples”.56 Those who are not so 
identifiable as subjects of that legal discourse remain excluded as unidentifiable, 
incomprehensible or misunderstood.57 They constitute the aberrant or “abject” domain.58  
Problematically, when Indigenous peoples’ rights claims are naturalised, scholars tend to 
uphold human rights claimed by Indigenous peoples as their natural laws and treat Indigenous 
peoples as natural, rather than legal, subjects.59 In conflating international human rights law with 
native first laws, such scholars insufficiently recognise that those who claim human rights must 
act in conformity with international legal discourses – for example, the doctrine of discovery – 
which pre-exist and pre-regulate the meanings of those rights.60 This type of rights-based legal 
discourse produces, what Young calls, a “legal model”, which is a “partial picture of power”.61 
When the subject of the legal discourse is naturalised, one might see rights claimants as wielding 
                                                     
53 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020)6 at 8–9. 
54 Antony Anghie Imperialism: Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005)8 at 4. 
55 Antony Anghie Imperialism: Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005) at 6. 
56 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020)6 at 8–9. 
57 See Irene Watson “First Nations Stories, Grandmother’s Law: Too Many Stories to Tell” in Heather Douglas and 
others Australian Feminist Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2014) at 46–53. 
58 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020)6 at 9, citing Judith Butler Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (Routledge, London and 
New York, 1993) at 3. 
59 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 28–29. 
60 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 28–29. 
61 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 25–29. 
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their own power or a latent sovereign power62 or, more modestly, as a “negative liberty” or a 
“tool-kit against oppression”.63 Upholding rights in this way as mechanisms for providing 
Indigenous peoples with negative or sovereign powers that constrain states elides the processes 
whereby claiming rights imposes on the claimant a pre-existing discourse of power. It imposes a 
doctrine of difference whilst promoting an “oppositional” view of human rights. As Patrick Glenn 
asserts, human rights “emerge not in opposition to the state … but as the sole, approved means 
of resistance [which is] entirely consistent with an ongoing, imperial constitutional structure”.64 
Where First Nations, Aboriginal peoples and Māori can claim human rights “against” the state 
by enacting as subjects of international legal discourse, they therefore demonstrate their 
willingness to enter into legal relationships as subjects of a recognisable legal discourse. This de-
politicises disputes and blunts resistance,65 because where states have approved rights-claiming, 
Indigenous peoples may become willing subjects of state legal discourse and, in so doing, seek 
protections through the legal institution from which they desired protection.66  
Of course, Young’s view that Indigenous peoples become identifiable as “Indigenous 
peoples” through engagement with international legal discourse is itself contestable. There are 
other approaches that uphold Indigenous peoples’ rights (which stem from their own legal system 
or from agreements and/or conflicts with states), as distinct or distinguishable from international 
legal discourse and human rights law.67 There is nothing necessarily objectionable or wrong in 
doing so. Today, those who are recognisable as “Indigenous peoples” from an international legal 
perspective can nonetheless self-identify according to their own discourse and laws. And from a 
state-based perspective they may be recognisable, for example, as Māori, First Nations, American 
                                                     
62 Cathal M Doyle Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 2015) at 15, discussed in Stephen Young 
Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 2020)6 at 92–93. 
63 Michael Ignatieff “Human Rights as Politics, Human Rights as Idolatry” (Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
presented at Princeton University, April 2000); compare Wendy Brown “‘The Most We Can Hope for …’: Human 
Rights and the Politics of Fatalism” (2004) 103(2–3) South Atlantic Quarterly 451, referenced in Stephen Young 
Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 2020)6 at 25. 
64 H Patrick Glenn “The Three Ironies of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in Stephen Allen 
and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds) Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2011) at 176–177; see also Duane Champagne “UNDRIP (United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples): Human, Civil, and Indigenous Rights” (2013) 28 Wicaso Sa 
Review 9 at 15–16.  
65 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020)6 at 28.  
66 Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New York, 
2020) at 193 and 202–203. 
67 See Claire Charters “Finding the Rights Balance: A Methodology to Balance Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and 
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“historic” bases for Māori rights as recognised by the Treaty of Waitangi and human rights conceptions); compare S 
James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004). 
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Indian or Aboriginal peoples. However, the trouble Young identifies is that recognising all those 
peoples as “Indigenous peoples” invariably invokes international human rights discourse – even 
if their intention is to invoke their own laws – which then requires disentangling those peoples’ 
own laws and concepts from international legal discourse. It is not impossible to make 
distinctions between Indigenous peoples’ own laws and those of international legal discourse, but 
these approaches presuppose that the term “Indigenous peoples” can be used as a mere adjective, 
in a non-legal sense or as a naturalised signifier. To the degree that anyone maintains that 
“Indigenous peoples” as such pre-exist international legal discourse – even if Māori, First Nations 
and others did – they naturalise and universalise that subject-status and the international legal 
discourse through which it is reproduced.  
If, as we maintain, national legal discourses on rights are similar to the international legal 
discourse of human rights, then Māori and other First Peoples who enter into legal relationships 
with the Crown may therefore be seeking protections through the legal institutions from which 
they desire protection. There is, however, a potentially less restrictive manner for entering into 
legal relationships with the Crown, which we turn to now.  
C. Alternative Agonies 
 An agonistic deliberative process is an alternative model for entering into a legal 
relationship with the state. It can provide for ongoing negotiation between parties in a way that 
more fully attends to structures of power and, therefore, can operate to exclude the universalising 
and naturalising aspects of the doctrine of difference. We explain this model here and later re-
read the enactment of legal personhood for Te Urewera as largely consistent with an agonistic 
deliberative process. 
Although rights-based discourses can be considered sites of “agonistic concern”,68 to the 
degree that they produce partial pictures of power they are unlike agonistic deliberative processes, 
which aim to attune deliberative democracy to a broader theorisation of power.69 From a 
deliberative democratic perspective, Seyla Benhabib argues that democratic “legitimacy and 
rationality” is attained through the “process of collective deliberation conducted rationally and 
fairly among free and equal individuals”.70 In this way, democratic legitimacy derives from the 
fact that coercive claims “represent an impartial standpoint” that is equally in everyone’s 
interest.71 Central to this theory is the notion of reaching “rational consensus” through realising 
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the conditions of ideal speech discourse: the more equal, impartial and open, and less coercive 
the process is, the more likely the common interest will prevail.72  
Deliberative democracy is flawed for postulating that discourse can fulfil the conditions 
of an “ideal speech situation”,73 or that “rationality” enables “[r]eason [to] prevail over power”.74 
A deliberative democratic approach mirrors what Young calls a “legal model” of power as 
associated with rights-based discourse, which dichotomises rationality from power to produce 
the view that one should limit power through (legal) reason. Furthermore, as explained above, 
Vitoria established a discourse of universal reason, rationality and natural law on native 
individuals and communities to produce them as subjects of Spanish legality. As maintained here, 
rationality and reason are not opposed or oppositional to power: acting with reason and being 
identifiable as a rational speaker is necessarily to orient oneself as a subject within a discourse 
that others uphold as reasonable.75 Indeed, Chantal Mouffe explains that an agonistic deliberative 
approach maintains that the ability to be seen as a political actor is “constituted through acts of 
power”.76 Becoming a political actor requires inscribing discourse on oneself to confer the ability 
to use power in ways that others recognise and affirm.77 This process is exclusionary and 
importantly so. 
Through agonistic deliberative processes, various parties create “unity in a context of 
conflict and diversity” so that a unified pluralism emerges through a “conflictual consensus”.78  
But because of “the impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion”,79 it is 
impossible that the consensus formed is ever fully or finally stabilised. This destabilised 
consensus enables a more robust examination of what and who is excluded, as well as how the 
inability to fully finalise a resolution militates against essentialising identities and is receptive to 
the “multiplicities of voices” and complexities of power “that a pluralist society encompasses”.80 
Indeed, according to an agonistic model, a “[r]adical democracy … demands that we 
acknowledge difference” and engage in a “constant struggle and renegotiation of social 
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identity”.81 Only then can “antagonism” give way to a productive conflict of “agonism”.82  
An agonistic process that embraces conflict and the inability to fully finalise a state of 
legal affairs appears to produce problems that, for us, may be construed as virtues. A first such 
virtue is that agonistic deliberative processes remain exclusionary. As argued here, Māori and 
First Nations who attend to the broader uses of power in legal discourse may use this to militate 
against essentialism. They are also uniquely positioned to tactically operate some exclusionary 
features of an agonistic process. As explored in Part IV, because the Crown entered Māori into 
legal relationships, often against their desires, those who re-enter into legal relationships with the 
Crown will remake certain undesirable exclusionary features because they will be “constituted 
through acts of power”.83 But in so doing, they may be able to re-contest and exclude 
universalising and naturalising features of the doctrine of difference. This is what we evaluate 
below with the creation of legal personhood for Te Urewera.  
The second apparent problem is that using an agonistic deliberative process to enter into 
a legal relationship can only generate temporary stabilisations of power in an “ongoing 
confrontation”.84 Whilst a virtue of an agonistic process is that it “forces us to keep the democratic 
contestation alive”,85 as explored below, a situation that requires ongoing confrontation remains 
open to co-option by other discourses, particularly rights-based discourses that promise more 
stability, more emancipation and more control. Furthermore, rights claiming and rights granting 
is itself a form of democratic political contestation that may never fully or finally resolve 
disputes.86 However, for reasons explained below, it is a virtue of agonistic deliberative processes 
that they do not suggest finality can be attained.  
III. Colonisation and Legal Discourse in Aotearoa New Zealand 
The legal history of Aotearoa New Zealand is, to a large degree, defined by a colonial 
legal discourse. It persists through the implementation of a rights-based discourse that stems from 
the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty. As explored here, pre-existing legal discourse translates 
Māori legalities into “native title rights” under the integrationist logic of the doctrine of 
difference.  
A. Assuming Sovereignty 
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 As Robert J Miller and others acknowledge: “Britain sought annexation of Aotearoa via 
a treaty of cession steeped in a Discovery mindset.”87 Before entering into a treaty, however, it 
commenced by translating some iwi’s forms of governance into terms it could recognise – 
namely, by strategically acknowledging some iwi’s “independent sovereignty” via the 1835 
Declaration of Independence.88 British colonists then accelerated annexation through several 
events.89 First, Governor Gipps instituted the doctrine of pre-emption, importing a jurisdictional 
delineation contained in the 1763 Royal Proclamation, through the three Proclamations.90 In 
1840, 43 northern rangatira assented to the Māori but not the English version of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (the Treaty).91 Lieutenant-Governor Hobson then issued two proclamations of 
sovereignty on behalf of the Crown: the first over the North Island “by right of cession” and the 
second over the South Island “by right of discovery”.92 
The Treaty is widely heralded as New Zealand’s pre-eminent constitutional document,93 
representing the mechanism through which British and Māori legal systems would “be formally 
brought together in some sort of single accommodation”.94 However, seemingly irreconcilable 
translations between te reo Māori and English versions of the Treaty continue to stoke 
controversy, initiating a constitutional tension between a “Crown sovereignty narrative” and a 
“tino rangatiratanga narrative”.95 The English version exemplifies discovery principles, asserting 
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that Māori ceded absolute sovereignty in return for Crown protection and possession of their 
lands and properties, while Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Māori version) outlines an agreement of 
“respectful separation” in which Māori exercise rangatiratanga over their land, resources and 
people.96  
While many iwi rangatira accepted the Treaty, the British entered them into a pre-existing 
legal discourse and relationship that iwi could not and would not have accepted, which the 
Waitangi Tribunal recently asserted.97 For example, Hobson proclaimed discovery over the South 
Island on the basis that those Māori were “uncivilised”.98 For the British, the Treaty was a 
consummate discovery document that provided for the “autochthonous legitimation of the 
existing [British] constitutional structures”.99 After the Crown assumed sovereignty, it entered all 
Māori into legal relations as subjects and, through iterative, uneven and often-inconsistent 
processes, came to uphold courts of the Crown as the primary and sole legitimate means of dispute 
resolution.100 In this way, Aotearoa New Zealand’s legal system was not imposed monolithically 
in 1840 but developed and changed in response to local situations, and Māori strategically used 
the court system to advance their own purposes.101 However, colonists brought a pre-existing 
rights-based discourse and adjudication system to Aotearoa New Zealand. This required Māori 
to re-enter into legal relationships and confirm that they were willing subjects of the Crown’s 
courts by translating their experiences, customs, practices and laws into a foreign legal system. 
While Māori legal systems may parallel or have borrowed from the settler colonial legal system(s) 
in numerous respects (which may internally motivate Māori claimants to continue engaging with 
rights-based discourse),102 translating Māori customs, practices and legalities into a colonial 
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rights-based discourse for recognition by the courts of the Crown involves the doctrine of 
difference. Some earlier colonial cases, particularly in the criminal legal realm, had limited scope 
and influence, but, as Shaunnagh Dorsett writes:103 
 
When Māori came before the new settler courts there was no genuine meeting – there was no 
exchange and no witnessing of one’s laws by another. There was an imposition of law. 
 
Settler courts imposed law on Māori. An example of how New Zealand’s colonial court 
system began imposing the doctrine of difference arises in R v Symonds, which translated Māori 
mana whenua104 into a rights-based legal discourse.105  
In R v Symonds, Chapman J observed that the “intercourse of civilized nations” with 
“aboriginal Natives” had established principles of law – that is, the pre-existing discovery-driven 
legal discourse articulated in the United States.106 Chapman J reasoned that, as “the Queen is the 
exclusive source of title”, the Court could not waive the Crown’s right of pre-emption.107 
Chapman J therefore established the Crown’s monopoly power over legal rights because, within 
the imperial hierarchy, the Court did not have the power to override the Crown. Notably, the 
Court also found that the “occupiers” had native title.108 
In effect, Symonds imported the “jurisprudential literature minted and honed in the United 
States” on Indian title into New Zealand.109 Regarding native title, Chapman J observed that “for 
their protection, and for the sake of humanity, the Government is bound to maintain, and the 
Courts to assert, the Queen’s exclusive right to extinguish it”.110 The vulnerability of native title 
to extinguishment “for the sake of humanity” exemplifies the doctrine of difference of a rights-
based discourse.111 Mirroring Marshall CJ, Chapman J imposed the universal notion of 
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“humanity” on Māori to enable the Court to translate their unique land relationships into 
positivistic rights, which burden the Crown’s paramount title. Upholding a supposedly universal 
but Eurocentric concept to rationalise the “curing” of Māori difference from British “proprietorial 
conceptions of rights in wealth” demonstrates the application of the doctrine of difference through 
legal discourse.112 The application of pre-existing legal discourse to translate the issues presented 
in Symonds into a legal problem the Court could rule over “[did] not assert either in doctrine or 
in practice any thing new and unsettled”.113 Instead, Symonds applied the doctrine of difference 
to displace Māori legalities and integrate them within its pre-existing proprietorial and imperial 
legal discourse.114 
B. “Tougher New Evangelism” 
Although some Māori strategically engaged with that rights-based system, others were 
subjected to it as others resisted. This led to dispossession and, at times, violent clashes.115 
Angered by the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty and growing disputes over land alienation, 
the Kīngitanga Movement began opposing land sales, which triggered the New Zealand Wars.116 
The Crown then imposed a “tougher new evangelism” where legal discourse became “the central 
tool in destroying the Māori way of life”.117 The Native Land Court, established under the Native 
Lands Act 1862 and Native Rights Act 1865, was central to this legal crusade. Through those 
Acts, the Crown waived its right of pre-emption and allowed Māori to freely alienate their land 
if they were willing to subject themselves to the Court in order to translate communally-held land 
into individualised freehold title, which removed its aberrational nature.118 The 1862 Act’s stated 
purpose directly imported the doctrine of difference: it sought to “promote … the advancement 
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and civilization of the Natives” by ensuring “their rights to land were ascertained, defined and 
declared”.119 In this way, the Court obtained the ability to translate Māori communal 
responsibility for land into the British conception of private property.120 The 1865 Act then 
deemed Māori to be “natural-born subjects of Her Majesty”, which demonstrates how the 
assumption of sovereignty naturalises its subjects by entering them into its presumptively 
universalising colonial discourse.121 The Native Land Court became “extraordinarily effective” 
in operating as a “veritable engine of destruction” of Māori legality.122  
This “new evangelism” carried the doctrine of difference to its extreme in Wi Parata v 
Bishop of Wellington.123 There, Prendergast CJ declared that, upon colonisation, “the aborigines 
were found without any kind of civil government, or any settled system of law”.124 Māori were 
deemed “primitive barbarians”, meaning that “the old law of the country” was disregarded and 
“the Government must acquit itself […] of its obligation to respect native proprietary rights and 
of necessity must be the sole arbiter of its own justice”.125 Prendergast CJ applied the doctrine of 
difference as previously enacted in the United States and that strongly resonated with the terra 
nullius doctrine implemented in Australia.126 In dismissing Māori as “barbarians”,127 Prendergast 
CJ did not need to translate Māori laws into a rights-based legal discourse. The Court denied 
Māori any legal recourse by constructing them as wholly aberrant, which naturalised as it 
integrated a primitive view of Māori within the colonial legal discourse.128 As “New Zealand’s 
paramount discovery case”, Wi Parata was not conclusively overruled until 2003.129  
However, in the intervening years, socio-political movements transformed Māori-Crown 
relations. In 1975, the Government established the Waitangi Tribunal as a “permanent 
commission of inquiry empowered to receive, report, and recommend on alleged Crown breaches 
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of Treaty principles”.130 From the mid-1980s, the Crown committed to engaging with Māori in a 
Treaty settlement process.131 The New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General case (the 
Lands case),132 moreover, enunciated the statutorily incorporated “principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi” as “partnership, reasonableness, and good faith”.133 However, the “underlying tenet of 
Discovery” continues to “haunt legal and political reasoning”,134 particularly through its 
deployment of a rights-based discourse.  
C. Reproducing the Doctrine of Difference 
The 2003 case, Ngāti Apa v Attorney-General,135 “poignantly recognises the interests of 
Indigenous peoples”.136 However, it also provides only a partial picture of the power at work in 
legal discourse, fails to account for the pre-regulated influence imposed on Māori by translating 
their relations with land into legal discourse and reproduces a colonial legal discourse to 
naturalise the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty. The Ngāti Apa Court affirmed the jurisdiction 
of the Māori Land Court (the contemporary iteration of the Native Land Court) to determine the 
status of land covering the foreshore and seabed,137 finding that the Crown’s assumption of 
sovereignty had not itself extinguished Māori “customary property interests”.138 In reaching this 
conclusion, it overruled Wi Parata139 and “reintroduced the full spectrum of the Native title 
doctrine”.140 The Court found that the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty was the acquisition of 
“radical title” that was “burdened” by common law native title rights,141 which were capable of 
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extinguishment “only by consent or in accordance with statutory authority”.142 Elias CJ held that: 
“Any property interest of the Crown in land over which it acquired sovereignty … depends on 
any pre-existing customary interest and its nature.”143 Accordingly, Ngāti Apa held that Crown 
sovereignty and native title co-existed, but only where the Crown had not exhibited a clear and 
plain legislative intention to extinguish native title.144  
In doing so, the Court institutes as it reproduces the doctrine of difference that subjects 
Māori to the state. The Court’s starting point is that its authority stems from the Crown’s 
assumption of sovereignty and, hence, that the Crown’s radical title is burdened by Māori’s 
“native title rights”. The Court supports its assertions that the Crown’s “notional ‘radical’ title, 
obtained with sovereignty, was held to be consistent with and burdened by native customary 
property” with citations to cases like Johnson v M’Intosh, St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber co 
v The Queen, R v Symonds and others.145 Elias CJ insisted that this was “not a modern revision”.146 
However, as Mark Hickford argues, earlier notions of the “underlying title as a fee simple differed 
from succeeding late twentieth and early twenty-first century views as to ‘radical title’”.147 David 
Williams picks up on Hickford’s insight to argue against “a golden thread of reasoning about 
native title independently actionable at common law in the courts”.148 According to Williams, 
Ngāti Apa demonstrates that courts have found this golden thread convincing, but it depends on 
an “ahistorical” legal method to re-write the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty as a “radical 
title” alongside native title as a common law concept.149  
By constructing Māori relations to land within its legal discourse, the court allocates land 
rights to Māori as instruments designed inter alia to underpin the relationship between them and 
the state.150 To prove they have these native title rights, Māori are forced to subject themselves, 
their relationships and cultural practices to the state’s legal discourse, which retains the legally 
legitimate ability to unilaterally “extinguish” those rights. In doing so, the court enables the state 
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to regulate and naturalise Māori within the imported British legal discourse. 
Ngāti Apa upholds native title rights as what Māori need (and naturally have) but regulates 
and structures what they can do. Its act of translation reproduces a dynamic of difference by 
casting Māori legalities as either unintelligibly different and aberrant from the legal discourse of 
the common law or by translating them into identifiable subjects of it through the mechanism of 
native title.151 However, as a “burden” on state sovereignty, native title rights remain an 
aberration – they render the state imperfect through their presence. Ngāti Apa nonetheless retains 
the Crown’s capacity to extinguish native title and to thereby work towards “perfecting” its title, 
as indeed happened with the legislative backlash of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, asserting 
government ownership of that land.152  
Naturalisation occurs through the assertion that native title rights pre-exist the Crown’s 
assumption of sovereignty, which seems compelling and intuitive because it appears to uphold 
Māori as sovereign when Māori assert and claim native title.153 This naturalises native title by 
eliding historical and contemporary processes involved and reproduced in constructing those 
rights through a doctrine of difference. This naturalisation process then functions to uphold the 
Crown’s own law as universally needed and necessary for Māori. That is to say, the court creates 
and presents a Eurocentric legal construct, “native title”, as an ordering that has always governed 
Māori land relationships. Framing rights as “pre-existing” doubtlessly empowers Māori claims 
to practice and defend their forms of life in this way, and that legal opinion may have been better 
than what came before and superior to what came after.154 But it enables as it mandates that they 
re-enter into particular legal relationships with the Crown so that their disputes can be legitimately 
resolved. The resolution of the claim through a rights-based model thus offers a partial picture of 
power by generating an (at least somewhat) appealing legal model that remains imbricated in the 
state’s assumption of sovereignty.  
The permeating influence of the doctrine of difference in Aotearoa’s legal discourse was 
also reproduced in Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General. At issue in Wakatū was the New 
Zealand Company’s pre-Treaty purchase of 20 million acres from some iwi.155 As the Court 
explains, the “New Zealand Company was a private venture for systematic settlement in New 
Zealand” that sought to purchase land from Māori.156 It was unclear, however, whether the New 
Zealand Company could validly purchase that land from iwi because the Crown’s rights of pre-
emption assumed that land was not alienable unless it had been translated into native title for 
purposes of extinguishment, or a Commissioner under the Land Claims Ordinance process 
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determined that the “pre-1840 purchase had been on equitable terms”.157 In 1845, Commissioner 
Spain found the sale was on “equitable terms”, provided that the Company reserved one-tenth of 
the land for the benefit of Māori owners, as well as land “occupied by Māori pa, urupā and 
cultivations”.158 The Spain award formed the basis for the 1845 Crown grant to the Company 
under the same terms.159 Importantly, after the grant, the Crown continued to manage the reserves 
in accordance with an 1840 agreement stipulating that it assumed responsibility for lands reserved 
for Māori in Company purchase deeds.160 However, the “tenths reserves” were never properly 
identified or set aside, leading to their substantial diminution.161 In Wakatū, Māori claimants 
asserted that the Crown’s failure to set aside and manage the “tenths reserves” breached its 
fiduciary duties to the reserves’ beneficiaries.162 
Speaking for the majority, Elias CJ imported aspects of Canadian and Australian native 
title case law, observing that their reasoning “applies a fortiori to Māori interests in land”.163 
Citing the Canadian case Guerin v The Queen,164 Elias CJ established that a pre-surrender native 
right was “a pre-existing legal interest which was not created by Crown actions and could not be 
taken away except by lawful procedure”.165 The Court found that in Guerin, “the source of a 
distinct fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the Indians” is based on the “surrender 
requirement, and the responsibility it entails” to act for another’s benefit.166 Similarly, her Honour 
deemed the approach adopted in Guerin consistent with the approach adopted by Brennan CJ in 
the Australian case of Wik Peoples v The State of Queensland.167 
On this basis, Elias CJ found that the approach taken in Canada and Australia could be 
imported into New Zealand to position the Crown as fiduciary.168 The alienation of Māori 
property via the Land Claims process occurred “on terms which could only be fulfilled by the 
Crown” and which necessitated “assumption of responsibility to act in the interests of Māori 
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whose interests were surrendered”.169 As analogous to Guerin, her Honour found that there was 
a relationship wherein “the Crown undertook control of the surrender of existing interests of 
property it had undertaken to protect”.170 Therefore, the Crown created “conditions of dependence 
and obligation” and “a relationship of power” which established that it owed fiduciary duties to 
the Māori proprietors.171  
Wakatū undoubtedly provides some measure of justice to some descendants of Māori 
owners of confiscated land. Accordingly, Williams argues that the fiduciary duty in Wakatū 
constitutes a “modern development to provide justice on the actual facts of the case rather than 
an ongoing application of colonialist paradigms”.172 He contends that the Supreme Court has 
“stripped away the historical encumbrances of 19th Century reasoning” and adapted Canadian 
doctrines to meet contemporary local circumstances.173 Similarly, Dwight Newman argues that 
the Court’s use of “transnational legal materials”174 has “transformative potential”175 to “open up 
different options” so that the court could “develop a remedy in some complex historical 
circumstances”.176 In this way, Newman urges for a transnational dialogue, whereby settler-state 
jurisdictions learn and borrow successful rules from each other and thus elaborate on “what the 
past incorporation of Indigenous peoples into democratic states means for just approaches 
today”.177 
However, in assuming that rights-based legal discourse from other common law 
jurisdictions “applies a fortiori” to Māori relationships with land, the Court imported pre-existing 
and historically contingent legal discourse from foreign states. Doing so means that the particular 
hierarchies and notions of justice that have structured those states’ dealings are imported and 
imposed on Māori, thereby displacing Māori communities’ particular legalities and whatever 
Treaty jurisprudence is unique to New Zealand. Importing pre-existing legal discourse also re-
legitimises as it reproduces the violence perpetrated by the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty 
through imperial measures. It consolidates this violence by concealing the strategies of 
dispossession employed through legal discourse. Therefore, even if Wakatū provides a just or 
welcome result for specific claimants, using pre-existing legal discourse to rectify enduring 
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inequities simultaneously works to re-entrench, whilst concealing, the doctrine of difference that 
operates to subject Māori to the state.   
Findings that Māori proprietary relationships were “pre-existing rights of property” or a 
“sui generis” right reinforces the doctrine of difference but conceals how it operates.178 Of course, 
those who are today collectively known as Māori had their own laws and modes of living that 
pre-date imperial contact and the imposition of western legalities.179 Additionally, Māori 
practices, customs and legalities may embrace rights or rights-like conceptions of property or 
ownership that pre-exist, parallel or borrow from settler legalities.180 But the Court’s act of 
recognition is not neutral:181 its recognition translates pre-existing traditions and customs into 
“native title” for its purposes. This is not to conclude that Wakatū came to the wrong result, but 
instead, that pre-existing legal discourse constrains the Court, its subjects and its claimants. The 
Court’s articulation of a fiduciary duty further highlights why this is concerning.   
Whilst the language of Māori “dependence” and Crown “obligation”182 flowing from the 
Crown’s “assumption of responsibility in respect of the tenths reserves”183 secures a just outcome 
in the particular circumstances, it has worryingly paternalistic implications. A fiduciary analysis 
is grounded in a relationship where one party assumed control of another’s affairs, which may 
reinforce the racist conceptualisation that Māori lack agency while perpetuating a “paternalistic 
and constitutionally immoral power structure”.184 It imports and reproduces the unequal 
hierarchies established in the Marshall Trilogy, where tribal relations to the United States were 
held to “resemble[] that of a ward to his guardian”.185 The law imposed is, however, not the exact 
same as the law imported – it is different and unique to Māori claimants and Aotearoa New 
Zealand. It is this difference and newness that provides subjects with a sense of ownership of the 
law. Yet, even if it produces a sense of ownership in this law, the “infantilising implications”186 
of Māori dependency appear to undermine the fundamental Treaty principle of a “partnership” 
between Māori and the Crown.187 
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This is a contestable view. For instance, Karen Feint argues that Wakatū’s importation of 
Guerin’s finding that the Crown owes fiduciary obligations consigns the “political trust” doctrine 
to “historical oblivion”.188 For Feint, this “represents a breakthrough in the courts’ willingness to 
intervene (in the absence of legislation) and hold the Crown to account into what has hitherto 
largely been cast as a political relationship”, as it confirms that “the Treaty’s Article II property 
guarantees are enforceable”.189 Feint thereby shows that Wakatū can be read as a “significant 
breakthrough” in law.190 If it is a breakthrough in the law of Aotearoa New Zealand, however, it 
comes at the expense of politics and subjection to a legal regime, which might be an acceptable 
and welcome trade-off for many Māori. Moreover, it is important to note that Wakatū established 
that the Crown owes a fiduciary duty to some, but not all, Māori. The Court emphasised that 
“none of this is to suggest that there is a fiduciary duty at large owed by the Crown to Māori”.191 
Only those who are able to bring this type of claim, one where a Spain award has been unfulfilled, 
are owed such a duty – and of potential claimants, not all will have standing.192 As a way of 
entering into legal relations then, it remains exclusionary.  
In short, Wakatū enacts and reproduces the doctrine of difference. While it may uphold 
some Crown obligations under the Treaty, it reproduces the obligations assumed by European 
colonists to intervene in the lives of the natives to protect them.193 Wakatū’s fiduciary duty 
confers an obligation on the state, through its legal discourse, which operates to naturalise Māori 
within it. Admittedly, a fiduciary duty may constrain the unilateral capacity of Crown 
extinguishment attendant on a rights-discourse by ensuring that, when the Crown exercises such 
discretion, it exercises that power in a way that protects “pre-existing” Māori interests. But it also 
transforms the rights-based legal discourse to give the Crown an obligation to intervene and 
protect the Māori interests which had already been translated into legal discourse. Within its 
unquestionable inherent jurisdiction, the Court operates on the assumptions of anachronistic 
native title at common law, universalising pre-emption, and unequal power structures that 
maintain, as it transforms and reproduces, the underlying doctrine of difference. There may, 
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however, be alternative and less restrictive ways for Māori to enter into legal relationships with 
the Crown. 
IV. The Agony of Legal Personhood  
Extolled as a “world-leading piece of legislation”,194 the Te Urewera Act 2014 paved a 
new way forward for Māori-Crown relations. The legislation recognised the former Te Urewera 
National Park as a “legal entity”: a legal person possessing “all the rights, powers, duties, and 
liabilities of a legal person”.195 The enactment of Te Urewera as a legal person was followed, in 
2017, by vesting Te Awa Tupua (the Whanganui River) with legal personhood.196 Focusing on 
Te Urewera, the creation of this legal personhood is the result of an agonistic deliberative process: 
it is an imperfect (and potentially deeply flawed) compromise that, importantly, excludes some 
features of the doctrine of difference.  
A. A History of Discovery and Dispute in Te Urewera 
The Te Urewera personhood settlement purports to reconcile the Treaty claims of Ngāi 
Tūhoe, an iwi that has experienced the ravages of colonialism.197 Tūhoe’s traditional lands centre 
on the rugged, inaccessible forests of Te Urewera.198 Encircled by mountains and rivers, Tūhoe 
cultivated a distinctive way of life underpinned by a place-based philosophy called mana 
motuhake.199 Given mana motuhake, Tūhoe did not sign the Treaty of Waitangi, although they 
were aware of it.200 Despite this, the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty was a cardinal 
application of discovery over Te Urewera that entered Tūhoe into a legal relationship without 
their assent.201   
From the mid-1860s, the “government wreaked long-standing havoc on Ngai Tūhoe with 
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many brutal invasions and large-scale land confiscations”.202 Te Urewera became the last “major 
bastion of Māori de-facto autonomy”.203 Exhausted by these waves of violence, in 1871 Tūhoe 
rangatira reached an agreement with the Government in which the Crown undertook to respect 
Tūhoe’s rohe pōtae (internal autonomy).204 Subsequently, the Crown steadily eroded Tūhoe’s 
rohe pōtae as “[c]olonisation became largely a matter of legal procedure”, which enabled the 
Crown to later dismiss the 1871 agreement as “no more than a temporary expedient at a time of 
war”.205 Through its legal discourse, the Crown then pursued its “prime objective” in Te Urewera 
of land sales.206 Tensions again flared, leading to the creation of the Urewera District Native 
Reserve Act 1896. It stipulated that Tūhoe’s internal autonomy would be protected and their lands 
not channelled through the Native Land Court, in return for their assent to an “alternative title 
investigation process” and their recognition of the Crown’s ultimate authority.207 That legislation 
created the Urewera Commission, which translated Tūhoe’s communal and non-marketised land-
based relationship under Tūhoetanga into individual, alienable title intelligible to legal 
discourse.208 After 1896, a series of governmental policies and lands legislation dispossessed 
Tūhoe of all but 16 per cent of the Urewera Reserve, most of which was “unsuited to settlement 
or economic development”.209 In 1954, the Government further restricted Tūhoe’s access and 
customary use of Te Urewera by declaring it a national park.210 Today, approximately 85 per cent 
of Tūhoe live outside Te Urewera and many of those who remain “suffer from socio-economic 
deprivation of a severe nature”.211 For these reasons, the Waitangi Tribunal concluded that the 
Government breached the Treaty by establishing the Te Urewera National Park, and 
recommended returning title to Tūhoe and allowing Tūhoe and the Crown to manage the park 
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jointly.212  
Consequently, Tūhoe re-engaged with the Crown in a Treaty settlement process, primarily 
“as a vehicle to ensure that te mana motuhake o Tūhoe is recognised”.213 Following protracted 
disputes surrounding Crown refusal to transfer Tūhoe ownership of Te Urewera, the parties 
compromised by granting Te Urewera legal personhood.214 Reconceptualising Te Urewera as a 
legal person provided “a mutually satisfactory solution” to a pernicious deadlock but failed to 
return Te Urewera to Tūhoe ownership and control, or to break from the Crown’s assumed 
sovereignty.215  
For good reasons, the unprecedented personhood compromise generated prolific media 
and academic interest.216 As codified in the Tūhoe Claims Settlement Act 2014 and Te Urewera 
Act 2014, personhood “recognises the way in which Māori […] conceive of and relate to” 
place.217 The Te Urewera Act explicates the personhood entity by defining Te Urewera’s tikanga-
centred ethos218 and establishes a guardianship structure of a Board to act on behalf of Te 
Urewera.219 The Board’s authority is exercised primarily by preparing and approving a 
management plan for Te Urewera.220 Importantly, this Board comprises nine members: six 
Tūhoe-appointed and three Crown-appointed.221 The governance structure for Te Urewera 
endows “extensive decision-making and regulatory powers” in Tūhoe representatives, 
notwithstanding the requirement that these powers are exercised with the agreement of “at least 
a majority of the Crown’s representatives”.222 The Board’s powers thus enable “substantial 
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incorporation” of Māori legality.223 Despite its many limitations, which we further discuss below, 
the Te Urewera personhood settlement excludes crucial features of the doctrine of difference.  
B. Agonistic Exclusions 
The enactment of Te Urewera as a legal person is “undoubtedly legally revolutionary”.224 
This legal person is the result of an agonistic deliberative process, which presents opportunities 
for those operating within Pākehā legality to listen and learn from Māori and thereby enter into 
legal relationships that may not directly or easily translate into a colonial legal discourse. It is an 
example of how to position the Treaty as “the site and […] ongoing subject of agonistic, 
deliberative politics”.225 
Unlike entering into a legal relationship through a rights-based discourse, such as Wakatū 
or invoking Indigenous peoples’ human rights, the creation of Te Urewera as a legal person was 
not the result of solely applying a pre-existing, colonial legal discourse. Instead, the agreement is 
a temporary stabilisation of power that is exclusionary. Katherine Sanders, for instance, 
emphasises the way in which the guardianship structures created for Te Urewera introduce 
procedural requirements that “engage the parties in participatory, deliberative decision-
making”.226 Board members must promote unanimous or consensus decisions, encouraging 
“ongoing deliberation over contesting purposes and principles”.227 The governance mechanisms 
reframe that contest so that it “reflects the understanding that settlement is contingent upon the 
maintenance of relationships”.228 Moreover, in keeping with an agonistic process, the 
compromises that created this legal person acknowledge fundamental conflict and disagreement 
regarding public authority to “reframe the terms under which this conflict continues”.229 The 
Tūhoe-Crown settlement is an iterative and unfinished process that requires ongoing negotiation 
and contestation.230 
The result of this agonistic deliberative process – legal personhood – substantively differs 
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from the colonial hierarchies defining the doctrine of difference. It does not singularly impose 
pre-existing Eurocentric legality on Tūhoe in a way that requires translating their legality into a 
rights-based discourse. It enables differences between the Tūhoe and Crown legalities to exist.231 
As an agonistic deliberative process, difference and conflict are temporarily embraced to promote 
an ongoing, if imperfect, relationship, which is not presumptively eliminated or solved by 
invoking a pre-existing universalised rights-based legal discourse. The dynamic of difference 
employed to naturalise Māori within the colonial legal discourse is largely excluded in favour of 
a generative, temporary, anti-essentialising and exclusionary tension. 
The priority and legitimacy accorded by this process to Tūhoetanga and the emphasis on 
Tūhoe’s place-based responsibility further excludes and displaces features of the doctrine of 
difference. As one scholar explains, recognising Te Urewera’s legal personhood “reflects the 
indigenous cosmological view of people as part of nature, not separate nor above it”.232 Instead 
of deriving authority from the assumption of sovereignty, cession, conquest or discovery, “the 
claim to exercise authority legitimately is bound […] to responsibility to place”.233 And those 
exercising powers under the Act must ensure, as far as possible, that “Tūhoetanga […] is valued 
and respected”.234 The opportunity for Tūhoe to exercise their kaitiaki responsibilities, moreover, 
maintains their authority as legitimate in relation to land and the legal person.235 Accordingly, the 
Te Urewera Management Plan unapologetically “pioneers approaches to management firmly 
located in the principles of mana motuhake”.236 
Importantly, Te Urewera’s legal personhood inverts the Eurocentric human–nature 
relationship to create “rules to manage the people rather than the land”.237 Indeed, Tūhoe reverses 
the relationship to humanity that a rights-based legal discourse embraces: it does not invoke a 
universalised signifier of “humanity” to uphold the state’s obligation to protect and civilise native 
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peoples.238 Tūhoe declares its intention to “reset[] our human relationship and behaviour towards 
nature. Our disconnection from Te Urewera has changed our humanness. We wish for its 
return.”239 It then asserts that “[h]umanity has much to gain from reigniting a responsibility to Te 
Urewera for within these customs and behavior lies the answer to our resilience.”240 It positions 
Tūhoe customs, behaviours and responsibility to Te Urewera as a resilient means for regaining 
their humanness, from which humanity has much to gain.  
Creating Te Urewera as a legal person does not seek to solve “the problem of difference 
by preceding it”.241 Instead, it enters Tūhoe and the Crown into a legal relationship wherein 
“authorities participate together to decide how different incommensurate reasons can be best 
accommodated”.242 The primacy of Tūhoetanga and mana motuhake within this agonistic 
encounter, therefore, enacts a “constitution[] … in situ” that reconfigures colonial structures of 
power in respect of a particular iwi and place.243 By reframing contestation within a place-based 
forum predicated on respecting Tūhoe’s specific histories, tikanga and mātauranga, the settlement 
markedly departs from the international and state legal discourses that reproduce a doctrine of 
difference. Nonetheless, the enactment of Te Urewera as a legal person has its limits.  
C. An Inescapable Structure? 
Because no resolution is ever fully finalised, legal personhood remains co-optable by state 
and international legal discourses and limitations imposed by the state. Notably, this new person 
does not dramatically alter much of the regulation that had applied to Te Urewera as a national 
park.244 Furthermore, Parliament “mandated that Te Urewera retain a particular teleology”,245 
requiring its powers to be exercised “in the manner provided for in this Act”.246 The state also 
refused to transfer sole ownership of Te Urewera to Tūhoe. Indeed, the state has re-asserted its 
underlying authority to “determine property rights”247 in a way that continues to dilute mana 
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motuhake by situating it within the pre-existing legal discourse and which does not diminish 
Parliament’s capacity to repeal the legislation by majority.248  
Unquestionably, the agonistic deliberative processes leading to and instituted by Te 
Urewera’s guardianship structures are co-extensive with the state’s assumption of sovereignty. 
The negotiations preceding settlement were premised on the Crown’s overriding authority in 
which the ability to enter into negotiations for settlement purposes was itself undesirably 
exclusionary.249 For instance, the Post-Settlement Governance Entities (PSGEs) created under 
these settlements are determined by the Crown and “force Māori into a dichotomy whereby they 
are negotiating ‘customary Māori systems of authority’”.250 More specifically, the Crown’s 
preference for negotiating only with “large natural groupings” conflicted with Tūhoe’s  hapū-
based governance practices.251 The resulting PSGE then tends to “support a dominant social 
group” and foment division within iwi as tensions invariably emerge between the seemingly 
pragmatic pursuit of economic development and the interests in strengthening “customary 
systems of authority”.252 
However, a benefit that arises from understanding the creation of this legal personality as 
an agonistic process is the demonstration that entering into negotiations is exclusionary. Unlike 
rights-claiming, which naturalises rights claimants through an ostensibly universal pre-existing 
discourse, the temporary and exclusionary compromise of legal personhood will ensure that 
Tūhoe’s identity and subjectivity as constituted through the agreement remains open to 
contestation from those who were excluded by the PSGE. This flexible and anti-essentialist 
approach can then help highlight pathologies created through entering into legal relationships 
with the Crown.253 There remains, however, a constant need for caution. Legal discourses can 
continue to assimilate Māori legalities through recognition and translation.254 Indeed, re-entering 
into a legal relationship that is exclusionary to create a legal person produces a new translation 
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of Tūhoe mana whenua and mana motuhake into something recognisable by, and to, a pre-
existing universalising legal discourse.  
For instance, many scholars have claimed that Te Urewera represents the recognition of 
so-called “rights of nature” in New Zealand’s law.255 Many scholars and others attempt to 
understand legal personhood foremost as “a mechanism to improve the environmental protection 
afforded to” such geographic entities via “better empowering them to defend themselves against 
forms of human development and degradation”.256 According to Andrew Geddis and Jacinta 
Ruru, such explanations are “at worst mistaken and at least are incomplete”.257 We agree because, 
under a rights-of-nature model, Te Urewera may become endowed with Eurocentric rights that 
require upholding state-sanctioned forms of legal dispute resolution as the primary or sole viable 
means of contestation. Apportioning rights to Te Urewera may reproduce a dynamic of difference 
by translating Tūhoe legalities into a pre-existing state-based legal discourse that would empower 
the majority-Pākehā judiciary to deploy terms of that legality. 
Others have analysed personhood in terms of compliance with Indigenous peoples’ 
human rights as recognised in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP).258 For instance, Toni Collins and Shea Esterling examine how granting legal 
personhood to the Whanganui River fails to comply with international human rights law without 
explaining whether Whanganui iwi wish to make claims deriving from international legal 
discourse. The authors write that omitting reference to the UNDRIP in the legislation “is a missed 
opportunity to bolster the legitimacy of the UNDRIP and New Zealand’s commitment to it”, 
which “begins to look like political resistance to international human rights law”.259 Although 
they demonstrate an admirable desire to use international human rights to bolster Māori claims 
to ownership, it is not clear that these iwi want to be identified as “Indigenous peoples” to invoke 
international human rights law. Nor is it established that the Whanganui iwi want “ownership”260 
or the state to have the rights-based obligations to intervene and protect their ways of living.  
Co-opting legal personhood by integrating it within rights-based legal discourses de-
contextualises the place-based settlements reached via agonistic Māori-Crown negotiation. If 
Indigenous peoples’ human rights begin to dominate the state’s legal discourse, then iwi with 
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unique relationships with the land, like Tūhoe, will also be required to enact as “Indigenous 
peoples” for purposes of human rights discourse.261 These discourses pre-regulate the meanings 
of terms like “Indigenous peoples” and so remove personhood from those iwi’s control. 
Therefore, though well-intentioned, these scholars may perpetuate a colonial move in re-
mobilising personhood’s specific purposes under a universalising and naturalising discourse. 
V. Conclusion  
Aotearoa New Zealand remains a colonial state. Its foundational structures and its 
contemporary legal discourse for Māori-Crown relations remains saturated in colonial discourses. 
However, the legal mechanisms effecting the subordination of Māori legality to the state were 
not conceived upon Captain Cook’s arrival on our shores. On the one hand, that legality pre-
exists Cook’s arrival and reproduces the universal natural law of the Catholic Church that 
European colonists later transformed into a positivistic legal discourse. On the other, that law is 
continuously made anew and reproduced in response to new circumstances, argument and claims. 
We have examined how contemporary legal discourse reproduces and transforms colonial 
legal forms. Legal models that reproduce rights-based solutions perpetuate colonial structures 
through a “doctrine of difference”, whereas agonistic deliberative models that generate ongoing 
contestation between Māori and the Crown enter both into a legal relationship that is not entirely 
pre-existing and universalising. That does not mean it is perfect or, necessarily, progressive. 
Tūhoe and the Crown made Te Urewera into a legal person, a compromise that represents an 
ongoing discussion and contest between them. It is not a perfect solution, and it does not 
emancipate Tūhoe from state legal discourse. But this innovative settlement re-centres 
Tūhoetanga and maintains an open-ended and unsettled means for ongoing contestation. 
Attending to broader conceptualisations of power may, in time, enable Māori and Pākehā to create 
forms of power that may challenge imperial formations, cultivate responsive relationships and 
continuously exclude the colonial. 
                                                     
261 See Stephen Young Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Rights: Troubling Subjects (Routledge, Oxford and New 
York, 2020)6 at 9. 
